University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2005

Rules, the New Standards: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Manageability After Vieth v. Jubelirer
Justin Driver

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Justin Driver, "Rules, the New Standards: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Manageability After Vieth
v. Jubelirer," 73 George Washington Law Review 1166 (2005).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Rules, the New Standards:
Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Manageability After Vieth v. Jubelirer
Justin Driver*

Introduction
Since the United States Supreme Court articulated the six factors comprising political questions in Baker v. Carr,1 legal commentators have predicted that the doctrine would not endure.2 The last four decades have
largely vindicated such predictions, as the Court has seldom applied the political question doctrine, 3 even in instances that many commentators believe cry

out for its application. 4 This infrequent deployment has prompted some ob-6

servers to conclude that the doctrine is all but dead.- In Vieth v. Jubelirer,

however, a four-Justice plurality dusted off the second prong of the political
question doctrine, urging that courts should not adjudicate partisan gerry-

mandering disputes due to the absence of "judicially manageable stan*

Charles Hamilton Houston Fellow at Harvard Law School. Thanks to Jessie Amunson,

Rosalind Dixon, Laura Ferry, Heather Gerken, Danielle Gray, Lani Guinier, Mort Horwitz, and
Spencer Overton for helpful comments.
1 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
2 See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L.
REv.54, 59 (1962) ("[W]e may legitimately wonder whether the [political question] doctrine ...
will now have a very lively future, for its viability as an aid to a policy of judicial self-restraint
would seem to have diminished considerably."); Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy
Quilts: Reapportionmentand Equal Protection,61 MIcH. L. REV. 645, 656 (1963) ("It has already
been noted that the Court so stated, at the level of simple assertion, that standards are not
lacking. If that proposition is in fact true, as claimed, then this aspect of the 'political question'
problem vanishes.").
3 The few instances in which the Court has invoked the political question doctrine include
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229, 237 (1993) (finding a political question in the context of
a judicial impeachment because of a textual commitment to another branch of government), and
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) (finding a political question to be present in judicial
review of the Ohio National Guard action that resulted in the shooting of four students).
4 The political question doctrine's absence was perhaps most conspicuous in Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 passim (2001); Laurence H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and Its Disguises:
Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV.170, 276-87 (2001).
5 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court?: The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 317 (2002) ("The demise of
the political question doctrine is part and parcel of this larger trend of refusing to accord interpretive deference to the political branches."); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan
Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1327 (1987)
("Baker seemed to inter the 'political question' objection to adjudicating cases like Bandemer.");
Mark V. Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability:The Transformationand Disappearance of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203 passim (2002).
6 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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dards. ''7 Whether Vieth signals the return of the political question doctrine,
or merely its decennial invocation, the case merits attention in light of the
plurality's opinion, which transforms the requirement for judicially manageable standards into a requirement for judicially manageable rules. 8 This erosion is significant because genuine standards represent the Court's most
viable path to meaningful judicial oversight of partisan gerrymandering. 9
The distinction between rules and standards enjoys a long lineage, extending at least as far back as the early 1930s. 10 The debate over form, as this
distinction is often characterized, has manifested itself in most fields of legal
inquiry and, more recently, has entered the field of election law."

Accord-

7 Id. at 305-06. The term "judicially manageable standards" is derived from Justice Brennan's well-known articulation of the political question doctrine in Baker.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Although one might contend that the quest for "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" contains two distinct steps, the Court has-even
at the inception-collapsed discoverability and manageability into one inquiry, as Baker v. Carr
itself uses the term "judicially manageable standards" to describe the second prong of the political question doctrine. Id. at 223. Accordingly, this Article will use the term "judicially manageable standards" in place of "judicially manageable and discoverable standards."
8 This does not, of course, mean that rules cannot satisfy the requirement for "judicially
manageable standards." As I will discuss further, Baker's call for "standards" represents the
"floor"-rather than the "ceiling"-required for adjudication.
9 An exploration of the myriad advantages of judicial oversight of partisan gerrymanders
lies beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, I assume here that such oversight is indeed
beneficial.
10 Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L.
REV. 475, 482-85 (1933) (describing rules as "precepts attaching a definite detailed legal consequence to a definite, detailed state of facts," and standards as "general limits of permissible
conduct to be applied according to the circumstances of each case. . . . The significant thing is
the standard, to be applied, not absolutely as in [the] case of a rule, but in view of the facts of
each case."). In addition to rules and standards, Pound also described legal directives as "principles," "conceptions," and "doctrines." Id.
This Article does not seek to provide an exhaustive account of the nuances separating and
uniting rules and standards. For particularly influential treatments of the distinction between
rules and standards, see generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & AL3ERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 155-58 (unpublished tentative ed. 1958); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
11 See Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of "JudiciallyUnmanageable" Standards in Election
Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1469 (2002); Spencer Overton, Rules,
Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65
(2002).
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ingly, the virtues and vices of rules and standards have become familiar.12
Although rules have the advantage of notifying actors about the consequences of particular actions and engendering uniformity and stability, they
have the drawback of being difficult to formulate and potentially lead to ex-

cessive rigidity. Conversely, although standards afford decision makers flexibility and individualization, they create a degree of indeterminacy and
uncertainty. To be sure, rules and standards are not strictly dichotomous, but

rather fall along a continuum, ranging from pure rules at one extreme to pure
standards at the other. 13 Despite difficulty in drawing clear distinctions, it is
worth maintaining the distinction between the two types of legal directives
because the choice between the two will often have profound
consequences.14
It is more than a little odd, then, for Justice Scalia-a man who has well15
developed notions about the benefits of rules and the costs of standards to use the terms synonymously in his Vieth plurality opinion. In his discussion of "judicially manageable and discoverable standards," Justice Scalia
writes: "It is the power to act in the manner traditional for English and

American courts. One of the most obvious limitations imposed by that re16
quirement is that judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule."
That last sentence is nothing less than staggering. Although the Court often

prefers to issue its legal directives as rules in the voting rights context,'1 7 cer12 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985)
(enumerating the virtues and vices of rules and standards).
13 See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at 158; Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25-30 (2000); Margaret
Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 823, 823
(1991) (understanding "ruleness" as located on a "theoretical continuum"); Frederick Schauer,
Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 646-51 (1991) (discussing particularistic decision making, rule-based decision making, and rule-sensitive particularism as points
along a continuum); Sullivan, supra note 10, at 57 (noting the classification of rules and standards based on the "continuum of discretion"); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 953, 961-62 (1995) (noting a continuum from rules to "untrammeled discretion").
Rules and standards are rarely "pure." Even the canonical rule of a speed limit contains
some exceptions and is therefore merely "rule-like" rather than a pure rule. In order to avoid
affixing "-like" to the end of these terms, this Article refers to "rule-like" legal directives as
"rules" and "standard-like" legal directives as "standards."
14 See Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards,2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303,
305 (maintaining that there is a difference between rules and standards); cf Baird v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 33 N.E. 827, 833 (N.Y. 1893) ("We have no trouble whatever in detecting the difference between noon and midnight, but the exact line of separation between the dusk of evening
and the darkness of advancing night is not so easily drawn.").
15 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989) (discussing the importance of rules in the U.S. judicial system). See infra text accompanying notes 80-84.
16 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion).
17 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986) (developing a mechanical three-part
test for lower courts to determine whether section 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been violated);
McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Gingles to mean
that "[t]he creation of preconditions-a choice of clear rules over muddy efforts to discern equity-shields the courts from meritless claims and ensures that clearly meritorious claims will
survive summary judgment"); see also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET"AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY
769-70 (rev. 2d ed. 2002) (considering whether Gingles "is ... yet another manifestation of the
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tainly nothing requires that it do so. Instead, genuine standards should suffice to render a case justiciable. By criticizing judicially manageable
standards for being standards rather than rules, Justice Scalia placed the
Court's advocates of judicial intervention in partisan gerrymanders on the
defensive. Congress and state legislatures could theoretically address partisan gerrymanders, but the practice's lengthy history indicates that self-regulation is unlikely to arise in the near future. If meaningful judicial oversight of
redistricting is to become a reality-thereby ensuring that the ideals of representative government are not subordinated to sheer partisan power-a majority of the Court must learn to stop worrying about discovering a
nonexistent magic rule and learn to love (or at least become comfortable
with) relying on standards.
This erosion of the distinction between bright-line rules and more flexible standards has pernicious consequences, as the Court will almost certainly
reject the rules available to the judiciary to rein in partisan gerrymanders. By
failing to insist that standards as well as rules can be judicially manageable,
proponents of judicial intervention have significantly reduced the potential
for meaningful regulation of partisan gerrymanders. Although partisan gerrymandering claims remain justiciable for the moment, justiciability will
likely remain a mere abstraction unless courts insist that actual standards satisfy the judicially manageable standards requirement. In the realm of partisan gerrymandering, in short, form not only follows function; form is
function.
Part I offers a brief overview of the Supreme Court's resolution of Vieth.
Part II explores how the Court's opinions in Vieth reveal distinct cleavages
over the specificity with which legal directives are announced to qualify as
judicially manageable standards. Part III examines the genesis of the judicially manageable standards requirement and concludes that the Court's issuance of genuine standards rather than rules can satisfy this requirement. Part
IV contends that the transformation of judicially manageable standards into
rules is significant because it threatens to prevent judicial oversight of partisan gerrymanders from becoming attainable rather than aspirational. The
available rules that the Court could select to address partisan gerrymandering are either unlikely to be adopted or unlikely to place a meaningful check
on partisan redistricting schemes. In other words, the choice (at least initially) is between standards or no oversight at all. Part V examines Vieth's
implications for judicial oversight of race-conscious redistricting schemes.

Court's preference for bright-line tests"); James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth
Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 14 (1982) (criticizing the Court's reliance on one person, one
vote instead of "devising standards to detect when municipal apportionment schemes actually
diluted the fundamental voting rights discerned in Reynolds"); Heather K. Gerken, New Wine in
Old Bottles: A Comment on Richard Hasen's and Richard Briffault's Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 417-23 (2001) (noting that judges find bright-line rules particularly
attractive when intervening in the political process).
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The Fractured Opinions in Vieth v. Jubelirer

In the wake of the 2000 decennial census, shifts in the distribution of the
national population determined that Pennsylvania would lose two of its
twenty-one congressional seats.1 8 Although slightly more Pennsylvania residents were registered as Democrats than Republicans, 19 Pennsylvania
Republicans controlled the governorship and both houses of the state legislature.20 Accordingly, Republicans controlled the redistricting process.2 1 Presidential adviser Karl Rove, Senator Rick Santorum, and House Speaker
Dennis Hastert (among other national figures) exerted pressure on the
state's elected officials to redistrict its remaining nineteen congressional seats
in a pro-Republican manner as an act of retribution for what they perceived
as pro-Democratic districting schemes enacted elsewhere.22 State officials
complied, producing a plan that was intended to elect as many Republican
23

officials as possible.

Three Pennsylvania registered Democrats challenged the redistricting
plan and alleged several constitutional violations, including a partisan gerrymandering claim and a one person, one vote claim.2 4 Initially, the threejudge district court panel dismissed all of the claims except for the equipopulational-one person, one vote-charge.2 5 Following an evidentiary hearing,
the court held that Pennsylvania's redistricting scheme contravened the one
person, one vote principle and enjoined the plan's implementation. 26 Pennsylvania then tinkered with the plan to bring it into line with strict equipopulational ideals, but did nothing to alter the lines that afforded the Republican
party a statewide advantage. 27 Applying the standard articulated in Davis v.
Bandemer28 as interpreted in Badham v. Eu,29 the district court panel issued
a per curiam opinion dismissing the partisan gerrymandering claim because
the plaintiffs failed to allege "facts indicating that they have been shut out of
the political process and, therefore, they cannot establish an actual discrimi30
natory effect on them.1

A severely fractured Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal. 31 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for a four-Justice plurality that found
18 Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (three-judge court).

19 Id. at 536 ("Of voters registered with one of the two major parties, 53.6% are registered
Democrats and 46.4% are registered Republicans.").
20 Id. at 535 n.3.
21 See id. at 535.
22 See id.
23

See id.

Id. at 541-47.
25 Id. at 549.
24

Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676, 678 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (three-judge court).
See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 241 F. Supp. 2d 478, 485 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (three-judge court),
affd sub nom. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
28 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986) ("[T]he racial minorities asserting the successful equal protection claims had essentially been shut out of the political process.").
29 Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1988), affd 488 U.S. 1024 (1989)
("There are no allegations that California Republicans have been 'shut out' of the political
process.").
30 Vieth, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (quoting Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 547).
31 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271-72 (2004) (plurality opinion).
26
27
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partisan gerrymandering cases nonjusticiable due to the absence of judicially
manageable standards. 32 In opposition to the plurality opinion, four Justices
produced three dissenting opinions that offered three distinct standards-a
spectacle that provoked one commentator to liken the standards to contestants in a beauty pageant. 33 Justice Kennedy found neither the plurality
opinion nor any of the dissenting opinions attractive. 34 Accordingly, Justice
Kennedy split the difference by holding that, although partisan gerrymandering claims remain justiciable, judicial intervention is predicated upon the discovery of manageable standards. 35 Despite the widespread hope that the
grant of certiorari signaled forthcoming judicial intervention, 36 the partisan
gerrymandering landscape does not now look terribly different from the regime established by Bandemer.
Justice Scalia begins the plurality opinion by noting that partisan gerrymandering has a long-if not exactly distinguished-history in the United
States. 37 After establishing the historical pedigree of partisan gerrymanders,
Justice Scalia turns his attention to the familiar language of the political question doctrine as articulated by Baker.38 In particular, Justice Scalia contends
that the absence of successful lawsuits challenging partisan gerrymanders in
the eighteen years since Bandemer indicates that the second component of
Baker v. Carr cannot be satisfied: "[N]o judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged.
Lacking them, we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was wrongly decided. ' 39 Because he finds
judicially manageable standards unobtainable, Justice Scalia contends that
the Court should overturn Bandemer and deem claims of partisan gerryman40
dering nonjusticiable political questions.
Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens concurs with the plurality that the second of Baker's six prongs is the relevant precedent. 41 "At issue in this case,"
Justice Stevens writes, "is Baker's second test-the presence or absence of
32 See id. at 305-06. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas joined
Justice Scalia's opinion. Id. at 271.
33 Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 627 (2004).
34 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 308-11 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
35 See id. at 316-17.
36 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Court to Hear Case on CongressionalRedistricting, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2003, at A10 (reporting that the Court's decision to hear Vieth could indicate
that it was prepared to give Bandemer teeth).
37 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion) ("Political gerrymanders are not new to the
American scene."). But see id. at 337 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality's
historical treatment of political gerrymandering if that history is "intended to suggest that the
vintage of an invidious practice ... should insulate it from constitutional review" (citation omitted)); cf. Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 281 (1973) ("The main thrust of lawyer's legal history, then, is
to pervert the real function of history by reducing it to the pathetic role of justifying the world as
it is.").
38 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277-78 (plurality opinion); see supra note 7.
39 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.
40 Id. ("To think that this lower court jurisprudence has brought forth 'judicially discernible and manageable standards' would be fantasy.").
41 Id. at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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judicially manageable standards. The judicial standards applicable to gerrymandering claims are deeply rooted in decisions that long preceded
Bandemer and have been refined in later cases. '42 Justice Stevens proposes
importing the standards devised in the racial gerrymandering context to the
regulation of partisan gerrymandering as well. 43 Drawing on Easley v. Cromartie,44 the latest in the Shaw line of cases, Justice Stevens suggests that
courts should invalidate districts in which partisan advantage was the "predominant" organizing mechanism in districting. 45 He argues that the two
lines of cases share underlying concerns, writing: "[T]he critical issue in both
racial and political gerrymandering cases is the same: whether a single nonneutral criterion controlled the districting process to such an extent that the
46
Constitution was offended.
Justice Souter's dissent begins by contending that courts "have not gone
from theoretical justiciability to practical administrability" because of
Bandemer's high threshold for proving an injury. 47 By Justice Souter's
lights-and history bears him out on this point-neither of the two major
political parties in the United States could demonstrate the systematic exclusion spread over a long period of time that Bandemer demands to legitimate
a claim of partisan gerrymandering. 48 After jettisoning Bandemer's standard,
Justice Souter then dedicates the overwhelming remainder of his dissent to
advancing a five-part burden-shifting test that attempts to reveal whether a
state has intentionally diluted the votes of some citizens by impermissibly
taking into account party identification. 49 Once a plaintiff has met these requirements, the burden would shift to the state to demonstrate that its districting scheme was not driven by strictly partisan considerations. 50 The plan
would avoid invalidation only by demonstrating that nonpartisan concerns
51
animated the district in question.
Id.
Id. at 334-36.
44 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
45 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The racial gerrymandering cases therefore supply a judicially manageable standard for determining when partisanship, like race, has
played too great of a role in the districting process .... [Plartisanship [can] be a permissible
consideration in drawing district lines, so long as it does not predominate.").
46 Id.
47 See id. at 344-45 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent. Id. at 343. Justice White, writing only for a plurality, wrote in Bandemer that "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion).
48 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 345.
49 Id. at 347-50. First, a plaintiff would need to "identify a cohesive political group to
which he belonged," usually a Democrat or Republican. Id. at 347. Second, a plaintiff would
need to demonstrate that his district largely disregarded traditional districting principles. Id. at
347-48. Third, a plaintiff would need to demonstrate that this deviation of traditional districting
principles was implemented in a way that could have an electoral impact because of the political
identification of residents. Id. at 349. Fourth, a plaintiff would need to create a hypothetical
district that would undo the partisan gerrymandering effect. Id. Fifth, the plaintiff would need
to demonstrate actual intent to have a partisan effect on electoral districting. Id. at 350.
50 See id. at 351.
51 Id. at 351-52.
42
43

2005]

Partisan Gerrymanderingand Judicial Manageability

1173

Unlike the dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens and Souter, which
concern themselves with individual districts, Justice Breyer's proposed standard would permit judges to assess the validity of statewide districting
schemes. 52 Justice Breyer also parts from his dissenting colleagues in conceiving judicial intervention as engendering majoritarian rule, rather than
protecting political minorities. 5 3 Justice Breyer opens his discussion of Vieth
by contending that partisan gerrymandering-when taken to extremes-has
the effect of short-circuiting democracy. 54 Instead of a five-part test, Justice
Breyer proposes a standard that would allow judges to intervene in districting
disputes in order to address the "unjustified entrenchment" of political parties.5 5 In an effort to define these central terms, Justice Breyer writes: "By
entrenchment I mean a situation in which a party that enjoys only minority
support among the populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold,
legislative power.' '56 What makes this entrenchment "unjustified," according
to Justice Breyer, is that "the minority's hold on power is purely the result of
partisan manipulation. '57 Justice Breyer closes by parrying the plurality's
contention that the sheer number of proposals advanced by the dissenters
illustrates that no judicially manageable standards exist. 58
Authoring Vieth's controlling opinion, Justice Kennedy ensures that the
status quo would prevail-at least for the moment.59 Justice Kennedy begins
by noting that partisan gerrymandering claims raise thorny questions for two
central reasons. 60 First, districting principles that appear neutral often have
nonneutral effects. 61 Second, manageable standards that would limit judicial
intervention have proven exceedingly elusive. 62 These concerns prompt Justice Kennedy to support the plurality's affirmation of the district court's dismissal. 63 Despite acknowledging the difficulties associated with adjudicating
alleged injuries arising from partisan gerrymanders, Justice Kennedy breaks
ranks with the plurality by refusing to foreclose altogether the possibility of
arriving at a judicial remedy: "That no such standard has emerged in this case
52
53
54
55
56

See id. at 358-59 (Breyer, J.,dissenting).
Id. at 360-61.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 360.

Id.
Id. at 368. One might also note that Baker calls for "judicially manageable standards,"
not the discovery of a single standard. It is hardly a logical non sequitur to suggest that multiple
standards are capable of directing judicial intervention.
59 Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 306, 308-09; see also Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for
Legislative Districtingin the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1, 74 (1985)
("[W]hat we think matters to almost all Americans when district lines are drawn, is how the
fortunes of the parties and the policies the parties stand for are affected. When such things are
at stake there is no neutrality. There is only political contest.").
62 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
63 Id. at 313 ("Because, in the case before us, we have no standard by which to measure
the burden appellants claim has been imposed on their representational rights, appellants cannot
establish that the alleged political classifications burden those same rights.").
57

58
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should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future." 64 Rather
than relying exclusively upon the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause to find judicially manageable standards, Justice Kennedy suggests that
the First Amendment might be a more apposite place to locate standards
required to distinguish permissible party considerations from impermissible
ones.

65

I.

Manageability: From Standards to Rules
This Part explores the significant variations among the Justices regarding
the specificity of legal directives necessary to satisfy the judicially manageable standards requirement. I first examine how Justice Scalia's plurality opinion elevates the requirement for standards into a requirement for rules and
demonstrates that his criticisms of the standards offered in the dissenting
opinions amount to little more than faulting standards for being insufficiently
rule-like. Next, I contend that the plurality opinion collapses an ostensibly
procedural inquiry into a merit-based inquiry. Finally, this Part grapples with
Justice Kennedy's controlling concurrence, asserting that his hybrid approach
combining the First and Fourteenth Amendments could well present the
Court with the fresh start that it desperately needs in locating a true standard
to rein in partisan gerrymandering.
Justice Scalia's transformation of the requirement for judicially manageable standards into a requirement for judicially manageable rules extends
well beyond his lone interchangeable use of the terms ("by standard, by
66
rule")
and pervades the plurality opinion. Attempting to distinguish previous voting rights cases that the Court has found justiciable, Justice Scalia
contends that judicially manageable standards are undiscoverable because
the Court cannot articulate another legal directive with the precision of the
one person, one vote rule.67 Justice Scalia asserts that "the easily administrable standard of population equality adopted by Wesberry and Reynolds
enables judges to decide whether a violation has occurred (and to remedy
it)" with little effort or mystery.68 By contrast, Justice Scalia writes, partisan
gerrymandering "require[s] judges to decide whether a districting system will
produce a statewide majority for a majority party [that] casts them forth
upon a sea of imponderables, and asks them to make determinations that not
even election experts can agree upon. ' 69 The problem with Justice Scalia's
analysis is that one person, one vote is as close to a pure rule as the judiciary
64 Id. at 311 ("Relying on the distinction between a claim having or not having a workable
standard of that sort involves a difficult proof: proof of a categorical negative.").
65 Id. at 314 ("The First Amendment may be the more relevant constitutional provision in
future cases that allege unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. After all, these allegations
involve the First Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their
participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their association with a political party,
or their expression of political views.").
66 Id. at 278 (plurality opinion).
67 See id. at 290. This point brings to mind John Hart Ely's quip about the benefits of the
equipopulation principle: "[A]dministrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome question
is what else it has to recommend it." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980).

68 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 290 (plurality opinion).
69

Id.
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could possibly articulate in the voting rights context. 70 Compared to the one
person, one vote rule's mathematical precision, it is no wonder that the contemplation of less concrete standards causes Justice Scalia to feel adrift at
71
sea.
Justice Scalia's assessment of the dissenters' proposed methods for invalidating partisan gerrymandering plans can be best understood as criticizing
their standards for not being rules. Consider Justice Scalia's criticisms of Justice Souter's standard:
While this five-part test seems eminently scientific, upon analysis
one finds that each of the last four steps requires a quantifying judgment that is unguided and ill suited to the development of judicial
standards: How much disregard of traditional districting principles?
How many correlations between deviations and distribution? How
much remedying of packing or cracking by the hypothetical district?
How many legislators must have had the intent to pack and crackand how efficacious must that intent have been (must it have been,
for example, a sine qua non cause of the districting, or a predomi72
nant cause)?
Justice Scalia's litany of questions can actually be reduced to a single
query: Why won't Justice Souter provide mathematical formulations to firm
up his test? 73 Although he praises one aspect of Justice Breyer's proposal as
"seem[ing] refreshingly categorical," Justice Scalia also attempts to demonstrate that the imprecision of the "unjustified entrenchment" standard makes
it judicially unmanageable. 74 Justice Scalia skeptically inquires whether the
"Judiciary may assess whether a group (somehow defined) has achieved a
level of political power (somehow defined) commensurate with that to which
they would be entitled absent unjustified political machinations (whatever
that means). '75 Contrary to Justice Scalia's intimations, however, none of the
proposed standards would afford lower courts untrammeled discretion. To
criticize standards for containing ambiguity is rather like criticizing the sun
70 Even that quintessential "rule" has some exceptions, including the larger deviations that
are permitted in state elections than federal elections.
71 Justice Scalia's skepticism about locating judicially manageable standards for partisan
gerrymandering finds an analogue in early commentary after the Court handed down Baker.
Indeed, one redoubtable commentator expressed such concerns in terms that precisely presaged
Justice Scalia's seafaring metaphor. See McCloskey, supra note 2,at 70 ("[I]t must be urged that
a price is paid for each judicial venture into uncharted and unchartable seas, whether or not an
analogue can be found in past or present judicial behavior."); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368, 388 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It was of course imponderables like these that lay at the
root of the Court's steadfast pre-Baker v. Carr refusal to enter the political thicket." (citation
and quotation omitted)). This comparison underscores that initial uncertainty in the judicial
realm sometimes proves overstated and the imponderable becomes ponderable. To extend (or
perhaps sink) the sea metaphor, the waters prove considerably calmer than they appear from the
shore.
72 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion).
73 See id. Of course, if Justice Souter were to offer specific numbers as guidelines, Justice
Scalia would have the option of criticizing him for acting as a legislator rather than a judge.
74 Id. at 299-300.
75 Id. at 299.
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for emitting heat. Put simply, standards by their very nature contain some
measure of indeterminacy.
Justice Scalia's preference for rules over standards manifests itself in
Vieth on topics ranging from the doctrinal to the historical and the literary.
With respect to the doctrinal, Justice Scalia takes Justice Stevens to task for
using First Amendment cases to illustrate how party affiliation may sometimes constitute an illicit consideration. 76 "What cases such as Elrod v. Burns
require is not merely that Republicans be given a decent share of the jobs in
a Democratic administration," Justice Scalia writes, "but that political affiliation be disregarded.'77 With respect to history and literature, Justice Scalia
criticizes Justice Kennedy's "never-say-never" approach to identifying judicially manageable standards by contending: "When it has come to determining what areas fall beyond our Article III authority to adjudicate, this Court's
practice, from the earliest days of the Republic to the present, has been more
reminiscent of Hannibal than of Hamlet. ' 78 It is occasionally better to be
79
assertive and wrong, in Justice Scalia's mind, than contemplative and right.
Justice Scalia's trumpeting of rules hardly comes as a surprise. Shortly
after joining the Court, Justice Scalia dedicated the Holmes Lecture at
Harvard Law School to espousing a theory of the rule of law as "a law of
rules."80 In that lecture, Justice Scalia confessed to having a youthful flirtation with the flexibility of standards before settling down with the precision
and certainty of rules.81 "When I was in law school, I was a great enthusiast
for this approach-an advocate of both writing and reading the 'holding' of a
decision narrowly, thereby leaving greater discretion to future courts," Justice Scalia wrote. 82 "Over the years, however-and not merely the years
since I have been a judge-I have found myself drawn more and more to the
opposite view."'8 3 Although acknowledging that a totality of the circumstances test may be unavoidable in certain contexts, Justice Scalia urged "that
those modes of analysis be avoided where possible; that the Rule of Law, the
law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question allows." 84 While
Justice Scalia's preference for rules fails to astonish, it is genuinely surprising
that his Vieth opinion demands rules when the rules themselves permit
standards.
The authors of the three dissenting opinions-Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer-defend their proposed standards as being judicially manageable.85 The three dissenters never expressly criticize Justice Scalia for demanding rule-like precision, but each dissenting opinion offers explanations
76 See id. at

294.

Id. (citation omitted).
78 Id. at 302.
79 See Scalia, supra note 15, at 1179 ("There are times when even a bad rule is better than
no rule at all.").
80 See id. at 1175.
81 Id.at 1178.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1187.
85 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 336 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 353-55
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 367-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77
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of how lower courts could meaningfully evaluate partisan gerrymanders by
implementing the proposed standards. 86 Rather than attempting to make
their standards resemble rules, each dissenter freely acknowledges the qualitative determinations necessary in evaluating partisan gerrymandering
claims. 87 "[T]he issue is one of how much is too much," Justice Souter writes,
"and we can be no more exact in stating a verbal test for too much partisanship than we can be in defining too much race consciousness when some is
inevitable and legitimate. '88 In a similar vein, Justice Stevens notes that the
Court does not evaluate racial gerrymandering claims through a lens of absolutes: "[T]he use of race as a criterion in redistricting is not per se impermissible, but when race is elevated to paramount status-when it is the be-all and
'89
end-all of the redistricting process-the legislature has gone too far." For
his part, Justice Breyer indicates that he will rely upon standards rather than
rules when he lays out a number of scenarios that explore "unjustified entrenchment" along a continuum. 90
The dissenters also share a belief that the criticism leveled in Justice
Scalia's opinion reveals the plurality's lack of concern with the practice of
partisan gerrymandering, rather than any endemic weaknesses in the proposed standards. 91 Indeed, it is difficult to understand the plurality's invocation of the political question doctrine in Vieth as anything other than a
merits-based inquiry masquerading as a procedural one. As Justice Souter
writes, defending his standard against the plurality's charge of imprecision,
"[T]his objection is more the reliable expression of the plurality's own dis92
couragement than the description of an Achilles heel in my suggestion."
Justice Stevens closes his dissent by leveling a similar charge: "What is clear
is that it is not the unavailability of judicially manageable standards that
drives today's decision. It is, instead, a failure of judicial will to condemn
even the most blatant violations of a state legislature's fundamental duty to
govern impartially. '93 If the Court finds judicial standards unmanageable
with respect to partisan gerrymandering, it may put into jeopardy much of
the Court's constitutional interpretation. 94 After all, the Court commonly
86 Id. at 334-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 345-52 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 365-67
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 365-67
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 344 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Stevens's use of the term
89 Id. at 335 (Stevens, J.,
"per se" underscores that judicially manageable standards need not be rules.
90 Id. at 365-67 (Breyer, J.. dissenting). Justice Breyer also signals his willingness to endure the necessary ambiguity of standards by acknowledging: "I do not claim that the problem of
identification and separation is easily solved, even in extreme instances. But courts can identify
a number of strong indicia of abuse." Id. at 365.
91 See id. at 354 (Souter, J.,dissenting); id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 354 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94 Martin H. Redish, JudicialReview and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031,
1047 (1985) ("[A]ny constitutional provision can be supplied with working standards of interpretation. To be sure, those standards often will not clearly flow from either the language or history
of the provision, but that fact does not distinguish them from many judicial standards invoked
every day. If we were really to take seriously the 'absence-of-standards' rationale, then we
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molds broad and often vague language into intelligible (if not necessarily
rigid) constitutional guidelines for lower courts to implement.
As one might expect from a decision split 4-1-4, the 1 in question embodies some competing notions about the crucial question that prevented either of the 4s from becoming a 5. To be sure, Justice Kennedy's controlling
opinion in Vieth largely endorses the potential manageability of standards,
but the opinion also contains some inchoate endorsement of the justiciability
concerns advanced by the plurality. 95 Early in his opinion, Justice Kennedy
uses language focusing on precision, a term-usually associated with the advocacy of rules. 96 Reminiscent of Justice Scalia's plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy also uses the terms "rules" and "standards" interchangeably in at least
one portion of his opinion. 97 Shortly after he expresses concern over "the
absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention," Justice Kennedy
writes, "Suitable standards for measuring this burden ... are critical to our
intervention." 98 The internal tension displayed in Justice Kennedy's opinion
might be best captured by his plea for locating "principled, well-accepted
99
rules of fairness."
Justice Kennedy's endorsement of standards is far from full throated.
Towards the end of his concurrence, Justice Kennedy veers back toward the
rules direction and expresses concern about the ability of courts to separate
permissible and impermissible redistricting schemes. 1°° He writes, "[C]ourts
must be cautious about adopting a standard that turns on whether the partisan interests in the redistricting process were excessive. Excessiveness is not
easily determined.''
As Justice Kennedy's opinion persists, however, he
ultimately embraces (or at least does not spurn) the traditional notion of judicially manageable standards.10 2 One can most strongly detect Justice Kennedy's willingness to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims without the
aid of a rule by his ruminations on the possibility of locating standards within
the First Amendment and importing them into the traditional Fourteenth
Amendment analysis. 10 3 The First Amendment, of course, is where rules go
would once again be proving considerably more than most of us had intended, for a substantial
portion of all constitutional review is susceptible to the same critique."); see also id. at 1060
("The so-called 'absence-of-standards' rationale borders on the disingenuous, because the Supreme Court has never been at a loss to decipher roughly workable standards for the vaguest of
constitutional provisions when it so desires.").
95 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306, 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
96 Id. at 306 ("I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and
precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases."); cf HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at 155 (beginning their discussion of rules
and standards by noting that "[t]he most precise form of authoritative general direction may
conveniently be called a rule." (emphasis supplied))
97 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 308.
100
101

See id. at 316.

Id.
102 See id. at 317 (acknowledging his willingness to fashion relief if "workable" standards
emerge).
103 Id. at 314-15 ("The First Amendment analysis concentrates on whether the legislation
burdens the representational rights of the complaining party's voters for reasons of ideology,
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to die. 10 4 As he closes his opinion, however, it seems increasingly clear that
he believes judicially manageable standards can be satisfied by actual stanJustice
dards. "If workable standards do emerge to measure these burdens,"
10 5
Kennedy concludes, "courts should be prepared to order relief.
Although early academic commentary on Vieth has largely criticized Justice Kennedy's ruminations on the possibility of locating standards under the

First Amendment as misguided, 10

6

his suggestion could help to reshape the

Court's voting rights jurisprudence in a sorely needed fashion. Admittedly,
criticism of Justice Kennedy's opinion is not completely unwarranted; there is
nothing intrinsically more appropriate about the First Amendment than the
Fourteenth Amendment as a repository of judicially manageable standards.
Nonetheless, one can locate some doctrinal justification for Justice Kennedy's invocation of the First Amendment in Vieth. Shifting the inquiry's
focus could prompt the Court to adopt a structural rather than an individual-

rights approach to political gerrymandering cases. 10 7 In particular, the line of
cases recognizing the right to "freedom of association" may come to be
viewed as offering statewide protection to political parties that have been

weakened by partisan redistricting practices.' 0 8 Under such a scheme, party
members could contend that statewide redistricting plans deny them the
amount of representation that they would otherwise receive if partisan interests had not influenced redistricting effortsY°9 By using the First Amendment alongside the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Kennedy suggests a
hybrid approach that might capture the nature of the harm inflicted by partibeliefs, or political association. The analysis allows a pragmatic or functional assessment that
accords some latitude to the States.").
104 The First Amendment is the home of balancing tests that weigh individual rights with
societal rights. See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 381 (1968) (articulating
a test for governmental regulation of symbolic speech that requires the government to have both
a valid and important interest and to narrowly tailor its restriction to further that interest);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47. 52 (1919) (announcing the "clear and present danger" test
for the suppression of speech).
105 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
106 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 33, at 628, 634-37; Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541,
563-64 (2004).
107 Heather Gerken, Lost in the PoliticalThicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004) (arguing that a structural account better accommodates partisan gerrymandering claims than an individually based account).
108 Cf Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1983) (stating that excluding candidates from a ballot "burdens voters' freedom of association, because an election campaign is an
effective platform for the expression of views on the issues of the day, and a candidate serves as
a rallying point for like-minded citizens"); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.").
109 Such an argument would, of course, place pressure on the Justices to announce a baseline that would indicate whether parties had received the number of representatives to which
they were theoretically entitled. The Justices feverishly resist announcing such a baseline in
Vieth presumably because they fear that doing so would be the first step on the march to proportional representation. They might successfully evade the baseline question, however, if they require plaintiffs to produce a redistricting scheme using nonpartisan principles and demonstrate
how the scheme would likely alter the outcome.

1180

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 73:1166

san gerrymandering more accurately. That harm, after all, affects groups of
voters rather than individuals because partisan gerrymanders have "the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters' representational rights." 110
Rather than interpreting Justice Kennedy's suggestion as merely the latest
ipse dixit in the voting rights cases, one could easily view Justice Kennedy's
suggestion as laying the groundwork for a more robust and pragmatic view of
voting rights injuries.11'
Even assuming that using the First Amendment has no doctrinal advantage, Justice Kennedy's proposed shift from an individual-rights framework
to a structural framework would nonetheless retain a vitally important virtue
in regulating partisan gerrymanders: giving the Court a fresh start. Indeed,
the Court has sorely needed a new approach since it tentatively declared that
partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable in Bandemer nearly twenty
years ago. 112 Although most legal commentators have criticized Bandemer
for insufficiently detailing what kind of partisan scheme would render a gerrymander unconstitutional, this critique misses the mark. The principal problem with Bandemer is not that the plurality's minimal effort to propose a
standard resulted in an unhelpfully vague legal directive (although ideally, it
could have been much more precise). Rather, the main shortcoming of
Bandemer's standard was that it simply made it too difficult for lower courts
to trigger a finding of unconstitutionality.
Under this view, Bandemer set the bar too high for either of the nation's
two major political parties to prove consistent degradation. Although all of
the Justices in Vieth recommend discarding Bandemer, one could craft an argument that the much-maligned case actually announced a standard that
could be interpreted as judicially manageable. 1 13 Evaluated on a standard of
predictability, for instance, litigants know that courts will almost certainly
uphold districting schemes. More important, the lower courts' refusal-or
unwillingness-to use Bandemer to strike down districting plans does not in-

110 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis supplied). The
Court has adopted such a hybrid approach in two cases cited in Justice Kennedy's opinion. See
Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-29 (1989) (relying upon Anderson's test to invalidate a California statute that sought to prohibit political parties from endorsing candidates during primary contests); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 805-06 (relying upon the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate an Ohio
statute that required presidential candidates to file statements of candidacy more than seven
months before the election because the state's interest in such a rule was outweighed by the
associational interests of voters); cf Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1665, 1666-67 (2001) (articulating an "aggregate rights" theory of
voting rights in which "the individual injury at issue cannot be proved without reference to the
status of the group as a whole").
11l Cf.Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 170-71 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (suggesting that the harm of partisan gerrymandering is based on an injury to
a group because it is groups of voters, not individuals, who elect representatives).
112 See id. at 125, 127 (White, J.).
113 Daniel Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymanderingand Equal Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 64 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) (arguing that the
fact that Bandemer generated no violations does not necessarily render it unmanageable).
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dicate, as Justice Scalia maintains, that the standard has achieved nothing. 114
The very threat of judicial intervention created by Bandemer may have
helped to constrain partisan-inclined actors responsible for establishing district lines. 15 One should not take the argument too far, however, for hanging swords must descend at least occasionally to be perceived as constraining
factors. Yet no one can doubt that partisan gerrymandering and bipartisan
gerrymandering practices would intensify further still if the courts announced
16
that anything goes in redistricting.'
Starting anew would allow the Court to lower the impossibly high
threshold of Bandemer and articulate a standard that would permit lower
courts to invalidate egregious instances of partisan redistricting. Admittedly,
if the standard affords lower courts a large amount of discretion, redistricting
plans that exhibit similar regard for partisan consideration could well lead to
judicial results that are difficult to reconcile. The main fear behind a standard that is too loosely articulated, of course, is that lower-court judges who
have insufficient guidance will (perhaps unconsciously) permit their own partisan affiliations to impact their determinations of whether a redistricting
plan is permissible. The last thing that the nation needs, of course, is a series
of Bush v. Gores in miniature. After an initial period of some uncertainty,
however, two developments will serve to justify a potential brief patch of
volatility. First, the Court will have an opportunity to select from competing
standards suggested by lower courts. Accordingly, it can choose a standard
that provides the judiciary with enough guidance to minimize discretion.
This pattern-a period of uncertainty, followed by the Court's articulation of
a clearer legal directive-is precisely what occurred in section 2 litigation
during the period between the Voting Rights Act's reauthorization in 1982
and Thornburg v. Gingles1 7 four years later. Second, and more important,
partisan actors that establish redistricting schemes will have strong incentives
to draw district lines in a way designed to avoid invalidation from the
114 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion) (describing the post-Bandemer period as
"[e]ighteen years of essentially pointless litigation").
115 Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment,and Incumbency: Leading the Legislature
to Police Itself,4 J.L. & POL. 653, 658 (1988) ("[Djangling the carrot of incumbency protection in
front of individual legislators ... creates a highly effective legislative self-policing mechanism.
Legislators value incumbency advantage so highly that they will think twice before drafting an
apportionment plan that a court might strike down."); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court
2003 Term, Foreword: The Constitutionalizationof Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 68
(2004) (contending that standards are desirable in voting rights law because legislators will often
internalize those standards and self-regulate in an effort to circumvent judicial intervention).
116 For an insightful argument about the distinct anticompetitive evils of bipartisan gerrymandering or "sweetheart" gerrymandering, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REv. 593, 598-99 (2002). But see Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of
Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for JudicialAcquiescence to Incumbent-ProtectingGerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 650 (2002) (contending that bipartisan gerrymanders lend
themselves to proportional representation through the creation of "safe districts"). Although
states recently altered the custom of redistricting only once decennially, no state has (yet) abandoned contiguity as a districting requirement. It is well worth considering whether the Court
would feel compelled to intervene if a districting scheme resembled a paint-by-numbers sketch.
117 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-51 (1986) (announcing a mechanical three-part
test to determine whether a cognizable claim of vote dilution has occurred).
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courts."" A meaningful threat of invalidation-something Bandemer never
realized-represents perhaps the most effective means of prompting actors
to police themselves and internalize judicial standards. Partisan officials will
be loath to invite invalidation of redistricting schemes and thereby threaten

incumbencies. 19
Although Justice Scalia contends in Vieth that Bandemer has achieved
little more than tying up the courts with adjudicating fruitless claims, 120 his
assessment is misguided for two important reasons. First, far less litigation
has occurred than Justice Scalia suggests. Indeed, as Justice Stevens points
out in dissent, the amount of partisan gerrymandering litigation since
Bandemer has far from overwhelmed the capacities of the federal judiciary.121 Second, as is suggested above, if the Court were to embrace an actual
standard, it could-somewhat counterintuitively-serve to decrease litigation
because of elected officials' wariness of judicial intervention. To the limited
extent that Bandemer increased the amount of partisan gerrymandering litigation, it may have done so not because of the existence of a standard but
because that standard was never utilized to invalidate a districting scheme. If
courts had invalidated even a few partisan gerrymanders, the authentic threat
of invalidation may have frightened redistricting bodies into establishing less
aggressive redistricting schemes.
IlL

Judicial Conceptions of Standards as Manageable Legal
Directives Since Baker v. Carr

The term "judicially manageable standards'1 2 2 has been the subject of
some contestation since it was first coined in Baker v. Carr in 1962. On its
face, the term contains more than a little ambiguity. As with Brown v. Board
of Education's sphinx-like directive to end segregation with "all deliberate
speed,"'12 3 the phrase simultaneously pulls in opposing directions. The first
part of the term, "judicially manageable," suggests precision and certainty,
notions normally associated with rules. Conversely, the last word, "standards," conveys a tolerance for flexibility and open-endedness. Although
Justice Brennan's phrase has been criticized for its ambiguity, this Part seeks
to demonstrate that the Court has understood the term to mean that genuine
standards-rather than exclusively rules-would suffice to render a dispute
beyond the scope of the political question doctrine.
Adding to this lexicographical uncertainty, Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Baker simply assumed the presence of standards without offering
any indication of where one might locate them. 124 "Judicial standards under
1t8 Cf. Ortiz, supra note 115, at 688-89 (arguing that legislators will respond to the threat of
invalidation accompanied by a court-imposed remedy on individuals).
119 Pildes, supra note 115, at 67-68 (arguing that precisely this self-policing dynamic
emerged in the Shaw line of cases).
120 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004) (plurality opinion).
121 See id. at 326 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, on average, only three or four
cases have been filed annually since Bandemer).
122 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962).
123 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
124 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
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the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar," Justice Brennan wrote, "and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action. 1 25 Commentators have vehemently criticized Brennan for assuming
rather than explaining this nondiscriminatory standard; they have been
equally critical of Justice Brennan's assumption that such questions were justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause but not under the Guaranty
1 26
Clause.
Beyond Justice Brennan's phraseology and simple assertion of standards, moreover, the Court implemented the term "judicially manageable
standards" in a manner that seemed to undermine the idea that genuine standards (rather than rules) would permit judicial intervention. Following
closely on the heels of the amorphous principles of Baker, the Court announced the one person, one vote rule in Wesberry v. Sanders127 and Reynolds v. Sims. 12 8 By quickly replacing a call for standards with the one person,
one vote rule, the Court invited confusion regarding the specificity required
of legal directives to render a matter judicially manageable. Indeed, Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion in Vieth draws on precisely this history to contend
that the Court cannot identify judicially manageable standards to regulate
partisan gerrymandering.

129

Despite the somewhat confounding terminology and early history of judicially manageable standards, however, inquiries into the language and
progeny of Baker indicate that the presence of standards would be sufficient
to avoid transforming a legal dispute into a political question. Tellingly, Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Baker revealed a distinct usage of the
term "standard," as he employed it throughout the opinion in a fashion that
Id.
See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s 62 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971) (contending that Brennan's assertion of
standards was "at best a shot in the dark, an arrow wafted skyward in the hope that some appropriate target might find it, and, at worst, an evasion of the problem"); Hasen, supra note 11, at
1477 (contending that Justice Brennan's assertion "was true only if taken to an unhelpful level of
abstraction"); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REv.
1201, 1201 (1996) (writing of Brennan's assertion, simply, "He was wrong.").
Despite this criticism, it is important to note that Justice Brennan faced real constraints in
Baker v. Carr in light of Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946), a case that found apportionment cases to be nonjusticiable under the Guaranty
Clause. For a perceptive piece analyzing the consequences of adjudicating apportionment cases
under the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Republican Form of Government Clause,
U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4, see Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes
and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2000). For adumbrations of McConnell's argument, see Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power, 38
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 367, 397 (1963) ("As a guide to meaningful standards which will be politically realistic, will minimize federal interference, and will allow some play in the joints and some
state diversification in representation systems tailored to local conditions, the equal protection
clause is woefully inappropriate.").
127 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
128 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
129 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 303-04 (plurality opinion).
125

126
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permits flexibility. 130 Conversely, Brennan used the term "rule" in Baker
13 1
only twice, both times in a fashion suggestive of a categorical directive.
Furthermore, Justice Clark's concurring opinion in Baker also contradicted
the notion that bright-line rules had to follow closely on the heels of the
justiciability determination: "No one.. . contends that mathematical equality
among voters is required by the Equal Protection Clause. But certainly there
must be some rational design to a State's districting. The discrimination here
does not fit any pattern-as I have said, it is but a crazy quilt. ' 132 Admittedly, Justice Frankfurter's dissent at times uses the terms "rule" and "standard" interchangeably,1 33 but one should not permit the dissent's imprecise
usage of these terms to undermine the majority and concurring opinions' deliberate usage.
The Court's development of its voting rights jurisprudence since the
early 1960s, moreover, strengthens the notion that Baker does not require the
articulation of rules. Justice White's controlling opinion on justiciability in
Bandemer should have erased any lingering doubt about whether standards
alone could prevent a dispute from being deemed a political question. In
Bandemer, Justice White, who joined the Court shortly after it issued Baker
and before it decided Wesberry and Reynolds, found that the Court need not
adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims with the precision of a one person,
one vote requirement in order to deem them justiciable. 134 Although "the
type of claim that was presented in Baker v. Carr was subsequently resolved
in this Court by the formulation of the 'one person, one vote' rule," Justice
White wrote, "[tihe mere fact ... that we may not now similarly perceive a
likely arithmetic presumption in the instant context does not compel a conclusion that the claims presented here are nonjusticiable.' 35 Justice White
continued, noting that Baker was not predicated on the discovery of a rule:
"The one person, one vote principle had not yet been developed when Baker
was decided. At that time, the Court did not rely on the potential for such a
1 36
rule in finding justiciability.
The Court's jurisprudence regarding race-conscious redistricting also belies the notion that judicially manageable standards must be quickly followed
by concrete rules. In the Shaw line of cases, for instance, although the Court
130 See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 ("There are sweeping statements to the effect that all
questions touching foreign relations are political questions. Not only does resolution of such
issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a
discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such questions
uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views." (citations omitted)).
131 See id. at 215 (discussing the political question doctrine as applicable to Indians, Brennan writes, "[T]here is no blanket rule."); id. at 224 (using the term "rule" in a parenthetical to
describe an actual rule).
132 Id. at 258 (Clark, J., concurring).
133 Id. at 305-06 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[Aipparently at the recommendation of the
Boundary Commission for England, the twenty-five percent standard was eliminated as too restrictive in 1947, and replaced by the flexible provision that constituencies are to be as near the
electoral quota as practicable, a rule which is expressly subordinated both to the consideration of
special geographic conditions and to that of preserving local boundaries.").
134 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986).
135 Id.
136 Id.

2005]

Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Manageability

1185

articulated several standards for separating permissible racial classifications
from impermissible ones, none of these standards approached a rule-like test.
Indeed, in Miller v. Johnson, the most recent iteration of the race-conscious
redistricting cases, the Court announced a "predominant factor" standard,
which is designed to invalidate districts where race is the most prominent
driving force in the creation of a district.1 37 Moreover, in Georgia v. Ashcroft,1 38 the Court permitted the creation of multiple "influence districts"
(rather than "majority-minority districts") without defining what percentage
of racial minorities would constitute a sufficiently large amount to qualify as
an "influence district" for the purpose of "retrogression" in interpreting section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.139 In sum, neither of these cases
announces a judicial rule to guide lower courts, but the Court nevertheless
resisted designating the matters political questions.
TV.

The Stakes (or Standing Up for Standards)

Criticizing the transformation of judicially manageable standards into judicially manageable rules is not a matter of mere verbal fastidiousness.
Rather, the erosion of the distinction between standards and rules proves
dispositive in determining whether courts will intervene to invalidate even
the most aggressive partisan gerrymanders. In addressing partisan gerrymandering, the Court could theoretically select either a substantive rule (which
would seek to affect the actual conduct of redistricting bodies) or a procedural rule (which would seek to alter the composition of redistricting bodies,
what those bodies could consider, and the frequency with which they may
redistrict). As a practical matter, however, all of the Vieth opinions conceive
of judicial intervention as a matter of substance rather than procedure. This
Part examines four rules available to the Court and concludes that none is
likely to be acceptable to a majority of the Justices. Because the available
rules are either unlikely to be palatable to the Court or unlikely to engender
profound change in redistricting practices, the judicial choice can largely be
understood as one between standards and no judicial oversight at all.
The first major substantive rule that would address partisan gerrymandering would have the Court impose a system of proportional representation.
Under such a system, political parties would be unable to prevent a competitive opposing party from capturing a number of seats because the parties
would receive seats according to the percentage of votes that they received.
Although a number of democratic nations practice proportional representation and some commentators have supported the system, 140 the Court has
137

Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).

138 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).

Id. at 480-89.
See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413, 1483 n.251 (1991) (proposing proportional representation as an alternative to the winnertake-all system); John R. Low-Beer, Comment, The ConstitutionalImperative of Proportional
Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, 164-65 (1984) (supporting proportional representation);
Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375, 384-85 (1981) (contending that only proportional representation truly meets the promise of one person, one vote).
But see Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymanderingand the Constitution:Into the Thorns of the Thicket at
139

140
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consistently expressed hostility toward the idea. 141 Indeed, the Justices view
proportional representation as less an idea than an epithet, 142 a slur to be
hurled at any electoral plan that strikes them as imprudent. Given the current pariah status of proportional representation, it seems safe to predict that
the Court will not adopt such a rule any time in the near future.
The second major substantive rule that would address partisan gerrymandering would see states rid themselves of districting altogether and employ statewide elections. The Court would no longer need to concern itself
with how the lines were drawn and instead could simply ensure that no lines
divided the state whatsoever. Just as the Court takes a dim view of proportional representation, it is committed to upholding the nation's tradition of
electing public officials in single-member districts. 143 Again, waiting for the
Court to initiate a rule requiring statewide elections seems quixotic.
Last, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 175, 179 ("[T]he establishment of another simplistic rule equivalent to
,one man, one vote'-such as proportional representation-would require courts and legislatures to go much further toward the complete disregard of the factors that Justice Frankfurter
correctly noted are at the heart of the districting process when properly performed."); Peter H.
Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1361 (1987) ("[P]owerful, perhaps irreversible, currents in American political life make the implementation of even a diluted proportionality norm increasingly
impracticable.").
141 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("Deny it as
appellants may (and do), [their] standard rests upon the principle that groups (or at least political-action groups) have a right to proportional representation. But the Constitution contains no
such principle."); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 362 (1997) ("[T]he
Constitution does not require States to permit fusion any more than it requires them to move to
proportional-representation elections."); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 912 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("In principle, cumulative voting and other non-district-based methods
of effecting proportional representation are simply more efficient and straightforward mechanisms for achieving what has already become our tacit objective: roughly proportional allocation
of political parties according to race."); Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130 ("Our cases ... clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in
reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats to the
contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be."); id. at 144-45
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("It is predictable that the courts will respond by moving
away from the nebulous standard a plurality of the Court fashions today and toward some form
of proportional representation for all political groups. The consequences of this shift will be as
immense as they are unfortunate."); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 122 (1980) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("The plurality's response is that my approach amounts to nothing less than a
constitutional requirement of proportional representation for groups. That assertion amounts to
nothing more than a red herring: I explicitly reject the notion that the Constitution contains any
such requirement."); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("Students of the mechanics of voting systems tell us that if all that matters is that
votes count equally, the best vote-counting electoral system is proportional representation in
state-wide elections. It is just because electoral systems are intended to serve functions other
than satisfying mathematical theories, however, that the system of proportional representation
has not been widely adopted.").
142 Sanford Levinson memorably dubbed the fixation on proportional representation in the
election law field a "brooding omnipresence." Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the
Brooding Omnipresence of ProportionalRepresentation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 257, 257 (1985).
143 Indeed, the support of Justices for single-member districts may be rivaled only by their
support for the two-party system. It is a truism that the Supreme Court has no theory of democracy. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics-andBe Thank-
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Instead of adopting a substantive rule, the Court could adopt a procedural rule that would invalidate redistricting plans that took into account any
partisan considerations whatsoever. 144 In Vieth, none of the nine Justices
came close to intimating that they would find minimal partisan consideration
impermissible or bar elected officials from redistricting bodies. 145 To the contrary, as discussed above, even the dissenting opinions found that the challenge lay in separating impermissible partisan considerations from
permissible ones. Accordingly, the current Court appears unlikely to institute a rule that would outlaw partisan considerations or prohibit elected offi146
cials from playing a role in redistricting.
Another procedural rule-and the only one that seems remotely feasible
in the near future-would call for the Court to forbid redistricting efforts that
occur more than once per decade. In conjunction with the census, the equipopulational rule requires that states redistrict their congressional seats decennially. Although the census dictates how often states must redistrict, no
rule prohibits how frequently states may redistrict. The Texas Republican
Party recently broke with the custom of redistricting only once decennially by
redrawing district lines mid-decade in an effort to increase its party's powers.147 At least one commentator has recently argued that a procedural rule
that limited redistricting to once per decade would have the benefit of introducing uncertainty into the minds of districting officials.1 48 Although it is
true that the adoption of a decennial redistricting rule would have some impact on how district lines were drawn, such a rule would likely return the
state of partisan gerrymandering to its pre-2000 levels rather than signal anything approaching a sea change. Indeed, a temporal rule would fail to prevent a political party from enacting the most aggressive, self-entrenching
partisan gerrymander that it could muster if it predicted that the state was
unlikely to undergo destabilizing changes over the next ten years.

ful for Small Favors, in THE U.S.

SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

245, 245-66

(David K. Ryden ed., 2000) (contending that the Court should not make its particular theory of
the political process the permanent view of the Constitution). Yet, it appears that at least one
tenet of that system is the stability afforded by a two-party system. See, e.g., Bandemer, 478 U.S.
at 144-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (extolling the stability of the two-party
system).
144 Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 116 (suggesting that courts presumptively invalidate redistricting schemes that were created by partisan entities).
145 See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("A determination
that a gerrymander violates the law must rest on something more than the conclusion that political classifications were applied.").
146 See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 648 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A rule that
would invalidate all governmental action motivated by racial, ethnic, or political considerations
is too broad.").
147 See Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457-59 (E.D. Tex.) (three-judge court), vacated sub nom. Henderson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004).
148 Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 769-76
(2004). Cox does not indicate that the Court is necessarily the institution that is best equipped to
announce the decennial rule, but it is clear that he believes that the benefits of such a ruleindependent of who initiated the rule-would be real.
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These four rules are not, of course, the only rules that the Court could
utilize to address partisan gerrymandering. 149 They are, however, the most
readily available rules that would impact the levels of partisan gerrymandering. Because partisan gerrymandering does not lend itself to establishing absolutes without crossing over into legislative activities, proponents of judicial
intervention will need to insist upon emphasizing "standards" in at least
equal measure to "judicial manageability." In the partisan gerrymandering
context, in sum, we are very likely left with standards or nothing at all.
V.

Vieth's Implications for Race-Conscious Redistricting

Extension of the Court's rigid conception of manageability with respect
to partisan gerrymanders could have potentially far-reaching consequences in
other realms of the political process. Taken to its logical conclusion, the plurality's insistence on rules could have the (presumably) unintended consequence of undermining judicial oversight of race-conscious redistricting. To
say that such a result is possible is not, of course, to say that it is likely. More
significant than the remote possibility of extending the Vieth plurality's logic
to race are the implications of the race cases for Vieth. Given that racial
identification is becoming increasingly complex, and that the Court is unlikely to formally abandon judicial oversight of race-conscious redistricting, it
is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Vieth plurality actually conducts a
veiled analysis of the merits.
Notably, Vieth's principal dispute about the specificity required when
courts issue legal directives takes place in a minor key with respect to the
competing views that Justices have on the similarities between racial identity
and party affiliation. Not surprisingly, this debate is at its sharpest in the
opinions authored by Justices Stevens and Scalia.' 50 For his part, Justice
Scalia attempts to cordon off the voting rights cases involving race from those
involving partisan gerrymanders, criticizing Justice Stevens's importation of
the "predominant factor" test from Miller into Vieth. "[A] person's politics is
rarely as readily discernible-and never as permanently discernible-as a
person's race," Justice Scalia writes.1 5 1 "Political affiliation is not an immuta152
ble characteristic, but may shift from one election to the next.'
149 For instance, the Court could decide that the practice of "kidnapping"-where redistricters place two incumbents in one district-was impermissible except when doing so was unavoidable because of a decrease in the overall number of seats. This Article, however, does not
seek to examine all of the potential procedural rules that the Court could adopt.
150 Justices Stevens and Scalia have been opposing forces in the debate over whether to
apply standards or rules for well over a decade. See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 88 ("If Justice
Scalia leads the charge for rules on the current Court, Justice Stevens is his most consistent,
standard-bearing antagonist. Justice Stevens has long favored sliding-scale approaches over categorical rule-bound approaches.").
151 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004) (plurality opinion).
152 Id. But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[W]e are just one race here. It is American.").
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Vieth acknowledges that there is some unmanageability in
race, but he does so only implicitly:
[C]ourts might be justified in accepting a modest degree of unmanageability to enforce a constitutional command which (like the Fourteenth Amendment obligation
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Although Justice Stevens responds to Justice Scalia by noting that voting
behavior is not as mysterious as the plurality suggests, 53 Justice Stevens
might also have contended that race is not so neat and readily identifiable in
the modern United States. One hardly needs to subscribe to postmodern
beliefs about the social constructions of race to understand that racial identity is growing increasingly complex in the United States in at least two tangible ways. First, the census itself now permits individuals of mixed racial
15 4
heritage to check multiple boxes when describing their racial background.
Second, although the Court developed its voting rights jurisprudence to address a racial world that it perceived as almost exclusively black and white, it
becomes increasingly difficult with each passing year to ignore that the
United States is a multiracial nation. Indeed, a large portion of the fastestgrowing ethnic group in the nation forsakes declaring a racial identity altogether.' 55 When Justice Scalia contends that Justice Stevens's proposed remedy is "saying, essentially, that if we can do it in the racial gerrymandering
context we can do it here, ' 156 proponents of race-conscious redistricting efforts might well invert this point. Using the argument to their advantage,
proponents might argue that because the Court cannot develop manageable
standards in the partisan gerrymandering context, neither can it do so in the
racial context.
Justice Scalia's bifurcation of racial considerations from party and geographical considerations in redistricting rings hollow because race, party, and
geography in the United States are often interwoven. 157 African American
voters live disproportionately in urban areas and overwhelmingly support
Democratic candidates. To pretend that one can discuss these three classifications discretely belies the modern political reality. "Consider, for example,
a legislature that draws district lines with no objectives in mind except comto refrain from racial discrimination) is clear; whereas they are not justified in inferring a judicially enforceable constitutional obligation (the obligation not to apply
too much partisanship in districting) which is both dubious and severely
unmanageable.
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286 (plurality opinion).
153 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 338 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The plurality asserts that a persons
politics, unlike her race, is not readily 'discernible.' But the assertion is belied by the evidence
that the architects of political gerrymanders seem to have no difficulty in discerning the voters'
political affiliation." (citation omitted)).
154 Ruth La Ferla, Generation E.A.: Ethnically Ambiguous, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, § 9,
at 1 (reporting that nearly seven million people selected more than one racial box during the
2000 census, the first time that doing so was permitted).
155 Rachel L. Swarns, Hispanics Debate Census Plan to Change Racial Grouping, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at 21 (reporting that fifteen million Hispanics selected the box indicating
"some other race" during the 2000 census).
156 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292 (plurality opinion).
157 THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 151 (1991) (noting the strong connection
between race and party identification); see also Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After
Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 69 (criticizing the Court for ignoring that "race is a
crucial basis of interest-group formation, with racial differences forming significant lines of political division"); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844-45 (1994) (criticizing the persistence of residential segregation along racial lines).
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pactness and respect for the lines of political subdivisions," Justice Scalia
writes. 158 "Under that system, political groups that tend to cluster (as is the
case with Democratic voters in cities) would be systematically affected by
what might be called a 'natural' packing effect. ' 159 If the Court continues to
permit partisan gerrymanders, it could result in a decline in substantive representation for urban black Democratic voters who, because of persistent
residential segregation, are particularly vulnerable to redistricting peculiarities. 160 Although courts will likely view urban black Democratic voters in
Republican-dominated states as losing out because of party affiliation, the
long arc of history in the United States indicates that the cause cannot be
isolated quite so readily.
Despite this potential for racial unmanageability, the Court is unlikely to
declare such matters nonjusticiable political questions and abandon its oversight of race-conscious redistricting schemes altogether. The Court, then, is
obviously willing to abide some indeterminacy to adjudicate matters that it
views as sufficiently important. Indeed, in Georgia v. Ashcroft,161 the Court
moved away from the "nonretrogression" standard articulated in Beer v.
United States, 162 which saw the creation of "majority-minority districts," to a
still vaguer standard. 163 The standard articulated in Ashcroft requires courts
to take into account the totality of the circumstances and consider "influence
districts" and "coalition districts" in addition to "majority-minority districts"
in adjudicating section 5 claims under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.164 It is
striking that the four members of the Vieth plurality (accompanied by Justice
Kennedy) willingly court unmanageability in Ashcroft but spurn it in Vieth.
Conclusion

Despite the Vieth plurality's disturbing erosion of the distinction between rules and judicially manageable standards, the Supreme Court nonetheless provided two small but encouraging reasons to suspect that it may
invalidate at least some partisan gerrymandering schemes in the near future.
First, in Cox v. Larios,165 the Court summarily affirmed a lower court decision invalidating a redistricting plan. 166 Although the population disparity
was within appellant's proposed ten percent safe harbor for population deviVieth, 541 U.S. at 290 (plurality opinion).
Id.
160 Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh RedistrictingParadigm Emerges in New
Jersey, 1 ELECTION L.J. 7, 22 (2002) (describing how descriptive and substantive representation
often act as competing ideals in high-percentage minority residential areas).
161 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539.U.S. 461 (2003).
162 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1976).
163 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 479-80.
164 Id. at 479-84; see Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). The Court's
reliance on the testimony of African American Congressman John Lewis in validating the Georgia plan makes it particularly difficult to determine the precise nature of the standard. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 472. The Court previously articulated such a standard in the 1960s by
invoking African American Congressman Adam Clayton Powell's endorsement of redistricting
efforts in Manhattan. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 53, 58 (1964).
165 Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004).
166 Id. at 2806 (Stevens, J., concurring).
158

159
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ations, the plan betrayed impermissible partisan considerations through violation of the one person, one vote requirement. 167 Second, in Henderson v.
Perry,168 the Court remanded a district court decision upholding a mid-decade redistricting plan and instructed the district court to reconsider the matter in light of Vieth. 169 Taken together, Cox and Perry suggest that the Court
may be willing to find that lower courts can indeed evaluate partisan gerrymandering claims that rely upon judicially manageable standards rather than
judicially manageable rules.

Heartening as Cox and Perry are for advocates of judicial intervention,
however, it would be mistaken to believe that either of these cases is likely to
produce a meaningful check on partisan gerrymanders if the Court does not
articulate a standard rather than a rule. Districting bodies intent upon enacting a partisan gerrymander can evade the judicial oversight granted in Cox by
ensuring that the plan follows the requirements of one person, one vote as
closely as practicable. Doing so will surely provide some limitations upon the
aggressiveness of partisan gerrymanders, but as the facts of Vieth vividly

demonstrate, the strict equipopulational requirements of U.S. congressional
districts have hardly brought an end to political parties' manipulation of district lines. 170 Similarly, in Perry, if the Court merely validates a rule that
would prohibit mid-decade redistricting, it would likely succeed only in re-

turning partisan gerrymandering to the levels that existed before states began
attempting to push the temporal envelope in the last few years. Such a result
would hardly be occasion to leap for joy. If the Court wants to give teeth to
judicial review of redistricting schemes and encourage redistricting bodies to
internalize criteria that will prevent egregious partisan gerrymanders, it will
167 Id. at 2806-08. Presciently, Justice Powell's opinion in Bandemer questioned whether
compliance with one person, one vote could inoculate districting plans from partisan gerrymandering claims. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 171-72 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
168 Henderson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004).
169 Id.; see Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457-58, 515 (E.D. Tex) (three-judge court),
vacated sub nom. Henderson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004). It seems worth noting that Judge
Higginbotham's prevailing lower court opinion in Perry suggested that the Supreme Court
should develop procedural rules (as opposed to substantive standards) if the judiciary is to continue hearing partisan gerrymandering claims. Id. at 475 ("[lI]f the judiciary must rein in partisan
gerrymanders, limitations that focus upon the time and circumstance of partisan line-drawing
and less upon the 'some but not too much' genre of strictures offer the best of an ugly array of
choices.").
170 See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534-36 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (three-judge
court); Vieth v. Pennsylvania 241 F. Supp. 2d 478, 480-82, 484-85 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (three-judge
court), affd sub nom. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Indeed, the lower court opinions
in Vieth demonstrate how the magnetism of one person, one vote has arguably made it more
difficult to achieve meaningful regulation of voting rights issues that extend beyond equipopulosity. See supra, text accompanying notes 24-30. For an argument contending that one
person, one vote operates as a limiting principle on the realization (and even the identification)
of more robust democratic ideals, see Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism
in Voting Rights Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1440 (2002) ("The
one-person, one-vote principle became a blunderbuss precisely because the Court lacked a sufficiently sophisticated normative theory to make contextual judgments about the health of the
political process and to place sensible limits upon the reach of the one-person, one-vote
principle.").
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need to abandon the relative comfort of rules for the uncertainty, ambiguity,
and indeterminacy that necessarily accompany standards. Although a more
precise legal directive may emerge over time, the Court's initial step will
likely require some flexibility in determining how much partisan consideration amounts to too much.

